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Notes 
Chapter 1 
1. The hyperinflations in Peru (beginning in 1988) and in Argentina (1989) are the 
only other hyperinflations that did not occur following a war or revolution. 
2.  The inflation rate for the hyperinflation is measured as the twelve-month change 
for  August  1985 over  August  1984. The  1986 measure  is  December  1986 over 
December  1985. 
3. See Malloy  1970 for an  authoritative  account  of  twentieth  century  Bolivian 
history before  the Revolution,  with  an emphasis  on the  secular decline of  the tin 
sector starting in the late 1920s. 
4. There are several questions about the quality of the Bolivian National Accounts. 
Reported figures by  the Central Bank of Bolivia differ, substantially in some cases, 
from those published by the IMF and the World Bank. Even more surprising, there 
are  significant differences  between  the  IMF  and  World  Bank  data.  In  the  book, 
National Accounts data up to 1979 are sourced in Central Bank data because they are 
more complete. The discrepancies with other sources are relatively minor. We  have 
preferred,  in  general,  World  Bank  data  for  the  period  after  1980.  It  should  be 
mentioned that the Central Bank substantially changed its methodology of  national 
accounting after 1980. The new data seem to invite a thorough revision. 
5. Coca production and consumption by Indian peasants in the Bolivian highlands 
have a secular tradition. Coca is used to fight hunger and the effects of physical stress 
in  populations  with  very  low  standards  of  nutrition.  Curative  properties  of  coca 
leaves have also been known  in the urban centers of  Bolivia for centuries: brewed 
coca leaves are used regularly to cope with minor ailments as diverse as high-altitude 
sickness  and  toothaches.  Many  Bolivians,  even  in  the  cities,  consider  coca  a 
miraculous plant.  It  must also be  added that coca  plants have a  natural habitat  in 
altitudes ranging between  1,000 and 2,000 meters.  Bolivia has great extensions of 
land on those altitudes. Productivity there is very high, and little capital investment 
and labor are needed to grow the coca shrubs. Cropping and marketing are, however, 
very labor intensive,  and most of the costs are incurred in those phases. High prices 
for the end-product  coca  usually mean  high  revenues  for everybody  in  the  chain, 
from  middlemen  to  hitherto  impoverished  peasants.  This  partially  explains  why 
eradication is so unpopular, especially with poor peasants. 
6. Bolivia briefly exported oil in the  1970s, but rising internal demand and falling 
reserves eventually led to an elimination of oil exports. Bolivia has continued to be a 
natural gas  exporter to  Argentina, but  financial relations  with  Argentina  have  been 
unsettled since the mid-l980s, with continuing disputes between the countries over prices, 
volumes, and repayments schedules. In 1987 and 1988, Argentina went into arrears on 
payments to Bolivia, resulting in a serious loss of public sector revenues for Bolivia. 
Chapter 2 
1.  The Bolivian Revolution is a complex event that defies easy summary.  It has 
been the object of  excellent  studies both  in  the  United  States (e.g., Malloy  1970; 
Malloy and Borzutsky 1982) and Bolivia. 
2.  In addition, the key political development of universal suffrage was also established. 261  BoliviaiNotes 
3. From the very beginning there was technical and managerial trouble,  adding a 
heavy  burden  to  the  fiscal  budget  and  penalizing  the  mining  sector,  which  was 
obliged to  sell  all of  its ores  to  ENAF, the  state enterprise  that controlled  the  tin 
smelters.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  construction  of  the  tin  smelters  had  been 
envisaged  for  decades,  but  private  cost-benefit  analysis  had  suggested  the  un- 
profitability of  the operation.  In  the  long run,  it is possible  that  improvements in 
technology  and  especially  in  management  could  lower  the  costs  of  operation 
sufficiently to justify the project, but this has yet to happen. 
4. In  1967, guerrilla units commanded by  Ernest0 “Che”  Guevara were defeated 
by  the Bolivian Armed Forces, supported by  U.S. intelligence and combat units. In 
the following years, there were several attempts, most of them by university students, 
to reorganize the guerrillas. 
At  the  time of  the coup d’Ctat  of  August  1971, there  were rumors of  a strong 
Brazilian influence and even intervention among the military. This in itself would not 
be  surprising in view of the place of Brazil in the geopolitics of the region. What is 
more important is the fact that the Brazilian model of development was regarded as 
the paradigm in economic matters by the new authorities. 
5. Paz Estenssoro broke away from the government in 1973 because of  the small 
(and  diminishing)  role  given  to  him  and  his  party  in  the  bureaucracy  and  in 
policymaking. FSB was a junior party in the coalition and it was dropped noiselessly 
after one of its leaders tried to stage a coup d’ttat in the eastern city of Santa Cruz. In 
spite of the rupture with the MNR and the FSB, Banzer retained in his bureaucracy 
some of  the technocrats of both parties. Many of them would later join Banzer’s new 
party, the Acci6n Democratica Nacionalista (ADN). 
Chapter 3 
1.  A good rationalization of  this point can be found in the Estrategia Nacional de 
Desarrollo y Plan Cuatrienal (Ministry of Planning, Bolivia, 1984), 45-52. 
2.  Planning and a high degree of  government intervention in the economy have a 
relatively long history in Bolivia. The extreme dependency on tin and the vagaries of 
that  market  in  the  1930s led  already  in  1942 (in  the  so-called  Bohan  Plan)  to a 
recommendation for govemment-induced  production diversification and the opening 
of  the eastern lowlands to modem agriculture and oil exploration.  A United Nations 
mission  in  1950  similarly  recommended  more  planning  and  a  more  active 
governmental role in the economy and in the provision of  social services. The MNR 
tried  to  implement  this  and  Bohan’s  advice  after  the  Revolution  of  1952.  When 
President Kennedy created the Alliance for Progress program,  one of the conditions 
to  have access to the  development  funds  provided  therein  was  to have a national 
development plan. In  1962 the Paz Estenssoro administration announced a ten-year 
plan of economic development. At the core of this plan, there was a set of  policies to 
promote an orderly recovery of tin exports to their pre-1952 levels. Some lip service 
was  also  paid  to import  substitution.  One  of  the  most  important  features  of  the 
ten-year plan resides in its investment program. Investment was to be oriented to the 
provision of social overhead to support production. With the exception of the needed 
funds  for  COMIBOL,  little  else  was  allocated  for  the  direct  involvement  of 
government in production. The plan was also innovative in its basic needs approach 
to  alleviate  extreme  poverty.  In  regard  to  the  sources  of  financing,  the  plan 
emphasized the  need to increase domestic  savings. However,  no specific measures 262  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
were included.  Also in the plan there is an underlying two-gap model with a clear 
recognition of foreign exchange bottlenecks. 
3. In  contrast,  the  1962  ten-year  plan  insisted  more  on  social  overhead 
investments for the peasantry holding individual plots of  land. 
4. In some other cases, such as the one with gasoline and other fuels, the public 
enterprises directly provided the subsidies to the consumer public.  Those subsidies 
were not, however, deducted from the tax liabilities to the Treasury. 
5.  This discussion is based on F. Machicado (1987). 
6. This discussion is also based on F. Machicado (1987). 
Chapter 4 
proceeds of  export sales. The index is constructed as follows: 
1. PPX  measures  the  real  volume  of  imports  that  can  be  purchased  using  the 
PPX, = [P,,  * Xr/P,,] / [P,  * x P,lO  * 100, 
where year zero is the baseline year (1980) in table 4.1, P, is the price of exports, P, 
is the price of imports, and X is the volume of exports. Note that movements in PPX 
can be  decomposed  into  movements  in  the  terms  of  trade  and  movements  in  the 
volume of exports: 
PPX, = [(P,t/P,,)/(P,o/P,o)l  * Kr/xo). 
Bolivia in fact suffered large declines  in  the volume of exports (which  fell by  31 
percent between  1980 and 1988) and in the terns of trade (which fell by  11 percent 
between  1980 and 1988), according to the  1988 data of ECLAC, tables 8 and  10. 
2.  The foreign trade policies  between  1964 and  1978 are discussed  in detail  in 
Morales (  1982). 
3. Contraband  color  television  sets,  personal  computers,  stereos,  and  even 
automobiles have been sold in the open market in the most important Bolivian cities 
at below international prices since the mid-1970s. Allegedly, this is possible because 
those contraband imports serve to launder drug money (or “coca-dollars”). 
4.  The system of prior import deposits consisted of a 120-day deposit in Bolivian 
pesos in the domestic banking system to which the private importers were liable. The 
deposit had to be equal to a given percentage, with a ceiling of 25 percent, of the CIF 
value of the imported goods. These deposits did not earn interest and were subject to 
a 100 percent reserve requirement. 
5.  The government tried, in doing so, to avoid a confrontation with the IMF, since 
most forms of administrative allocation of foreign exchange could have been judged a 
violation of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Registration of the 
demands for foreign exchange had a mild deterrent effect on capital flight. 
6.  The  use  of  the  foreign  exchange  system  for  several  functions  other  than 
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market has been very clearly stated by Cooper 
Errors  and  omissions  picks  up  capital  flight  that  corresponds  to  measured 
exports  and  imports  (i.e.,  when  measured  exports  do  not  contribute  to  a  rise  in 
foreign exchange reserves or other measured foreign assets, the discrepancy appears 
in  errors  and  omissions).  However,  underinvoiced  exports  or  wholly  uncounted 
exports (e.g., cocaine) will contribute to capital flight that is unmeasured by  errors 
(1971, 10-13). 
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and omissions. It is true that understatement of imports may lead to an overstatement 
of  capital  flight,  but  in  the  Bolivian  context,  the  understatement  of  exports 
(particularly drug-related ones) is likely to exceed the understatement of imports. 
8.  When the  UDP government  took  office in  the  fall of 1982,  one of  the  first 
measures  taken  was  to  eliminate  the  use  of  dollar-denominated  contracts  in  the 
financial system. All deposits and liabilities that had been dollar-denominated were 
obliged to be converted into peso-denominated assets at a stated exchange rate. This 
led  to a massive disintermediation  of  the  banking  system and to a flight for safer 
assets, particularly foreign exchange and other foreign assets. 
Chapter 5 
1.  In  1982, according  to  the  World Bank  Debt  Tables,  the  MLT  public  debt 
constituted 87 percent of the total external debt of  Bolivia.  The same ratio in  1985 
was  82 percent.  These data  suggest  that  the  MLT  public  debt is by  far the  most 
important component of total external debt. 
2. To some extent, the effective subsidy to debtors was paid for by an effective tax 
on depositors.  Specifically, depositors with dollar-denominated claims on the banks 
had their claims converted into pesos at a disadvantageously low exchange rate. This 
helped  the  banks  to  absorb the  costs of  converting their  claims  on private  sector 
debtors from dollars to pesos at the same disadvantageous exchange rate. 
3. This  legal  argument  has  frequently  been  employed  in  the  internal  political 
discussions on the debt, particularly by advocates of unilateral debt suspension. 
4.  A complete evaluation of  the National System of  Projects appears in JUNAC 
(1985). 
5. Among them was the investment banking firm of Salomon Brothers. 
6. The four tranches and the terms of the refinancing were as follows: 
Tranche IA:  Short-term  debts  past  due  between  August  1980 and  April  1981. 
Maturity of 3% years and a grace period of  1 year. Interest charges at 
LIBOR  + 2  percent. 
Tranche IB:  Medium- and long-term debts having reached  maturity between April 
1980  and April 1981.  Maturity of 6  years and a grace period of 2  years. 
Interest charges at LIBOR  + 2% percent. 
Medium-  and long-term  debts reaching  maturity  between  April  1981 
and  April  1982.  Maturity  of  5 years  and  a grace  period of 4  years. 
Interest charges at LIBOR + 2% percent. 
Tranche 111:  Medium- and long-run debts reaching maturity between April 1982  and 
May  1983. No  agreement  was  reached  on  maturity  or grace  period. 
Interest charges at LIBOR + 2% percent. 
In addition to these terms, Bolivia was charged a myriad of fees and organization 
costs:  a  once-and-for-all  flat  fee  of  1  percent  of  the  rescheduled  debt  for  the 
coordinator bank; an annual fee of  U.S.$49,000  for the coordinator bank; a fee of 
0.375 percent  on  tranche  IA  and  1.125 percent  on  tranches  IB  and  11;  and  all 
organizational and legal expenses. 
Chapter 6 
1. If  hyperinflations  are  ranked  by  their  maximal  inflation rates  over half-year 
calendar intervals (January-June,  July-December),  the Bolivian hyperinflation ranks 
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seventh  in  the  twentieth  century,  following:  Hungary  (1946: l), Greece  (1944:2), 
Germany (1923:2), China (1949:1), the Soviet Union (1922:1), and Poland (1923:l). 
2.  Cagan defined the beginning of  hyperinflation as the month in which inflation 
exceeds 50 percent, and the end of hyperinflation as the month in which inflation last 
exceeds 50 percent and is then followed by  twelve months of  less than 50 percent 
inflation. 
3. In this case, m, e, t?  are measured at the end of  the month; T,  is the change 
in  the  monthly  price  level.  Ideally,  pt should  be  an  end-of-month  price,  with 
T,  = P, - P,-,.  Since  prices  are  available  only  on  a  monthly  average  basis, 
end-of-month prices for month  b-  1 are proxied by  a geometric average of average- 
period t and t-  1 prices. 
Chapter 7 
1. Monetary reform refers to the switch from one currency to another as part of 
the stabilization program.  Argentina switched from the peso to the austral in June 
1985 under the  Austral Plan;  Brazil switched  from  the cruzeiro  to the  cruzado  in 
March 1986; and Peru adopted the inti in place of the peso in September 1985. The 
precise economic  content  of  such  a  shift  in  currency  depends  on  several  factors, 
including: (1) whether there is a tax on old money balances as part of the conversion 
process, and (2) the terms under which long-term contracts in the old currency are to 
be settled in the new currency. 
2. This paragraph,  of  course, describes a highly schematic view of  the linkages 
between  the  budget  and  inflation.  The  point  is  not  to  be  comprehensive,  but  to 
emphasize the crucial link in the Latin American context between budget deficits and 
the exchange rate, and between the exchange rate and the domestic price level. 
3.  As a formal matter, an overvalued exchange rate combined with a black-market 
exchange  rate  acts  as  a  tariff.  Marginal  imports  are  priced  according  to  the 
depreciated  black  market  rate,  while  exports  (to  the  extent  that  they  are  not 
smuggled) receive the lower official exchange rate. Thus, the gap between the official 
and the black-market rate acts as a tax on exportables by reducing their price relative 
to  importables.  As  the  gap  widens,  the  resource  misallocations  caused  by  the 
overvaluation  of  the  official  rate  eventually  become  so  enormous  as  to force  an 
official devaluation. 
4.  In  a famous policy debacle, Chile fixed the peso-dollar exchange rate in the 
midst of a 35 percent annual inflation during 1979. While tradable goods prices soon 
stopped rising in Chile, nontradables prices continued to rise for two more years, in 
part because of a formal system of backward-looking wage indexation. The exchange 
rate fixing, combined with a huge inflow of short-term capital upon a liberalization of 
the financial system, led to an enormous squeeze of the tradable goods sectors in the 
country. Eventually the exchange rate had to be sharply devalued.  The inadvisable 
fixing of  the  exchange  rate  is  probably  one  factor  that  contributed  to the  severe 
recession  in  Chile  in  1982 (the other  factors  include  a reversal  of  the  short-term 
capital inflow, a terms-of-trade decline, and the rise in world interest rates). 
5.  At the time of the stabilization program, official bread prices were set at a tiny 
fraction of world market prices. There was, however, very little bread available at the 
ridiculously  low  official  prices.  Rather,  flour  and  bread  were  smuggled  to Peru, 
effectively setting the internal bread price in Bolivia at the level of the border price, 
net of the costs of transport and smuggling. Most bread available on the streets of La 265  BolividNotes 
Paz  was  sold  at  many  times  the  official  price.  The  middlemen,  rather  than  the 
consumers of bread,  were apparently the largest beneficiary of  the subsidized grain 
prices. 
Chapter 8 
1.  No bank will lend to the Argentine government, for example, even for a highly 
profitable  public  investment,  for  fear  that  the  loan  will  simply  become  part  of 
Argentina’s overall bad debt. It is dangerous to lend even if the individual project has 
a good return. 
2.  Negotiations may break down repeatedly, at high cost (e.g., with disruptions of 
normal trade financing), because the various parties have a continuing incentive to 
posture, to act tough, etc. For theoretical analyses, see Fernandez and Kaaret (1988) 
and Rotemberg (1988). 
3.  Even  if  the banks  know that  the debt cannot be  paid,  they may  still impose 
sanctions  for  nonpayment,  in order to impress other debtors  with  whom they  are 
negotiating. 
4.  Consider  a case  in which  a wonderful  economic reform  is  identified,  which 
would cost $100 million of current consumption in order to raise the debtor’s future 
income and its debt-servicing capacity by $200 million in present value. Suppose also 
that  all  of  this  incremental  debt-servicing  capacity  would  be  squeezed out of  the 
country by the foreign creditors in the course of  future negotiations. The debtor has 
no incentive to undertake the reform, even though it has a very high return, because 
the benefits accrue to the foreign creditors. However, if the country first entered into 
a buyback in which it paid $60 million for the $1 billion in debt, thereby cancelling 
the debt overhang, the debtor would then be free to undertake the investment and to 
reap the large returns. 
Note that this incentive effect could work by incentives on a given government (by 
leading the government officials to a rejection of  specific public investments or public 
sector reforms) or through the electoral  process (by contributing to the election of 
governments that oppose the reform efforts). 
5.  As an example, the country could negotiate with creditors to use the receipts of 
future export earnings as collateral for future debt-service payments, in cases where it 
would  be  administratively  possible  to  arrange  for future  export  earnings  to  accu- 
mulate in an escrow account out of reach of the country. 
6.  There are probably only four or five such banks in the United States. They are, 
however, among the  biggest banks.  Examples  include Citicorp,  Bank  of  America, 
Chemical Bank, Chase Manhattan, and Manufacturers Hanover. 
7.  I have been closely involved in the Bolivian debt negotiations as the govern- 
ment’s main outside economic advisor. 
8. There were no working meetings with the banks during this crucial period, as it 
was the official negotiations with the IMF and discussions with the U.S. government 
that were of most importance. 
9.  There are several complex reasons for this change of position. Most important 
was the ferocity of the crisis in Bolivia (with real per capita GNP having declined by 
almost  30  percent,  with  the  terms  of  trade  having collapsed,  and  with  a  virulent 
hyperinflation during  1984-85),  combined with the strength of Bolivia’s adjustment 
program (which eliminated tens of thousands of jobs in  state enterprises and closed 
the  budget  deficit by  more  than  10 percent  of  GNP almost  overnight).  Also,  the 266  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
United States had important foreign policy interests in  stabilizing democracy in  the 
country, since Bolivia borders most of the large countries of South America and has 
often been feared as a focal point of unrest (Che Guevara died in the Bolivian jungles 
in  1967). Moreover,  the  United  States  was  interested  in  pursuing  an  anti-cocaine 
policy  in  the  region,  which  could  only  be  accomplished  with  a  friendly,  stable 
government. 
10.  In  1988, Bolivia signed a three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
with  the  IMF,  based  on  a  program  of  balance  of  payments  that  presumes  that 
Bolivia’s remaining debt will be settled on terms similar to the buyback. 
11.  The financial “costs”  to Bolivia of the debt strategy have been minimal. If we 
judge the net cash costs of the buyback to Bolivia at $20 million, the country has paid 
in  total  over  three  years  less  than  1 percent  of  one  year’s  GNP  ($20 million/ 
$3 billion) to its commercial bank creditors. At the same time, Bolivia has received 
large net resource inflows from the official creditor community. Thus, in contrast to 
Bolivia’s net resource inflow, all of the other countries in the region have been making 
large net resource transfers to the foreign creditors (as Bolivia did during  1982-84). 
Chapter 9 
1.  Bolivia has already experienced the disaster of governance in conjunction with 
the coca mafia under the dictatorship of General Luis Garcia Meza. Garcia Meza’s 
brutal  role  led  to  the  worldwide  diplomatic  isolation  of  Bolivia,  which  in  turn 
contributed importantly to Bolivia’s financial rupture with the rest of  the world. 
2.  In other words, the export of coca paste has caused a secular appreciation of the 
Bolivian real exchange rate, thereby squeezing the profitability of legal export sectors. 
3.  Taxation  of  coca  production  and  exports  is  virtually  impossible  from  an 
administrative  point  of  view  and  is  strenuously  opposed  by  the  international 
community. It is judged that normal taxation of the sector would effectively lead to 
its legalization. 
4.  In  1986,  for  example,  the  Bolivian  government  undertook  joint  military 
operations  with  the  US. government  to interdict coca paste  exports  and to  drive 
down the internal price of coca leaf. The President faced impeachment proceedings 
for his actions  at the hands of  nationalist  elements  in the Bolivian Congress.  The 
action provoked  a run on the peso  and a nationwide banking crisis, as individuals 
sought to remove local deposits in anticipation of  a currency devaluation. In the end, 
the peso was successfully defended. 
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